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I. INTRODUCTION
The words in the title of this article, from the Hollies iconic song, capture
the essence and power of one individual providing assistance to another. It is the
most basic of human interactions, reflecting the ability of one person and the
need of the other. On the face of it, there is nothing particularly complicated or
complex in such a notion. However, as history repeatedly teaches us and as we
are reminded on a daily basis, we must not view this as a given. That assumption
would be a profound mistake with grave consequences. It is for that reason, as
we articulate in this article, that failure to provide minimal assistance to a person
in peril must not go unpunished. The words below movingly capture what should
be obvious to all.
The road is long, with many a winding turn
That lead us to (who knows) where, who knows where?
But I’m strong, strong enough to carry him
He ain’t heavy – he’s my brother
So on we go, his welfare is of my concern
no burden is he to bear, we’ll get there
For I know he would not encumber me
He ain’t heavy - he’s my brother
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If I’m laden at all, I’m laden with sadness
that everyone’s heart isn’t filled with the gladness
of love for one another.
It’s a long, long road, from which there is no return
While we're on the way to there, why not share?
And the long doesn’t weigh me down at all
He ain’t heavy – he’s my brother
He’s my brother – he ain’t heavy – he’s my brother . . .2
In this article, we address bystander responsibility from the perspective of
the individual in peril. Why and how the individual is in that condition is
irrelevant to the recommendation that a duty to act be imposed on the bystander.
The circumstances that directly, or indirectly, led to the distress are insignificant
to the legal obligation to intervene on behalf of the person in immediate physical
peril.
What is important is the distress of one individual—the victim—and the
ability of another—the bystander—to mitigate that travail. This is a victimfocused proposal, emphasizing the assistance required by the person in distress
and the bystander’s capability to provide immediate relief. It is that combination
that is essential to understanding the essence of the proposal: distress of person
A and capability of person B. While the duty, as we shall discuss, may be
mitigated under certain circumstances, the core recommendation entails
imposing an obligation to act on the bystander, who does not otherwise owe a
legal duty to the person requiring assistance.
A. The Bystander
The bystander is the person who observes another individual in distress,
knows of that person’s travail, and has the capability to act on their behalf. The
bystander is present at the moment of another person’s acute need. The question
is whether the bystander will act on behalf of that person or not act by choosing
to walk away. Re-stated, will the bystander provide assistance or deliberately
and knowingly ignore, thereby committing a crime of omission? Should the
bystander choose to walk away, whilst having both the knowledge of the distress
of another and the capability to mitigate the harm, the bystander is culpable of a
criminal act.
We define assistance narrowly: just dial “911,” thereby alerting the
authorities as to the dire circumstances of another individual. Adoption of
legislation would punish the bystander for failing to provide the victim with
concrete assistance. Commensurate with a significant educational undertaking,
it would also serve as a deterrent to the broader public: failure to provide
assistance to the person in peril will result in criminal prosecution.
Similar legislation has been adopted in ten states and a number of countries,
2

Id.
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reflecting a fundamental re-structuring of the relationship between individuals
and significantly extending beyond a moral obligation.3 Relying on an
aspirational model is, perhaps, satisfying on a basic human level intended to
accentuate the basic goodness of people. However, that model does not translate
into reality when examined under a bright light on the proverbial operating table.
It is for that reason that we have joined forces with Utah State
Representative Brian King, who has twice introduced legislation that defines the
failure to call 911 as a Class B Misdemeanor resulting in a $1,000 fine and/or
six months imprisonment. In this article, we analyze both State Rep. King’s
proposed legislation and criminal codes in other jurisdictions regarding the
bystander duty to act obligation. In addition, we examine in detail the hearings
before the Utah Judiciary Committee,4 which twice voted in favor of State Rep.
King’s proposal, and the debate on the Floor of the Utah Legislature, which
twice voted to defeat the legislation.5 We have had significant interaction with
legislators, Attorney Generals, and public officials in a number of states and
countries considering bystander legislation.
As part of our efforts, we have examined existing bystander legislation in
ten U.S. states6 and more than two dozen countries7 regarding application in
those jurisdictions. Our findings are detailed in this article. Furthermore, we
have interacted with school officials in a number of states, as educating the
broader public regarding the legal obligation to act would be an essential
component of the legislative undertaking.
B. Legislation
The essence of “bystander legislation” is criminalizing the failure to act on
behalf of a person in peril. There is no intent to equate the bystander with the
perpetrator; the actions of the latter do not equate with the actions or inactions
of the former. However, the bystander’s decision not to provide assistance
enables the actions of the perpetrator. In a historical context, the perpetrators of
the Holocaust were enabled by the complicity of the bystander.8
3

Do You Have to Rescue Someone in Danger?, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2017), https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-us-canada-40680895 [https://perma.cc/Z5H9-FPW7].
4
Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2018 Leg.,
62d Sess. (Utah 2018) [hereinafter Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125],
https://le.utah.gov/av/committeeArchive.jsp?timelineID=105983 [https://perma.cc/S9H2-NP89];
911 Responsibilities in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2019
Leg., 63d Sess. (Utah 2019) [hereinafter 911 Responsibilities in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B.
170], https://le.utah.gov/av/floorArchive.jsp?markerID=106198 [https://perma.cc/T5P7-PR8Q].
5
Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4.
6
Vermont, Washington, Ohio, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Hawai, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, and California.
7
Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia.
8
See generally AMOS N. GUIORA, THE CRIME OF COMPLICITY: THE BYSTANDER IN THE
HOLOCAUST (2017).
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Our motivation in this recommendation is two-fold: to ensure that critical
assistance be provided to the victim and to penalize the bystander who failed to
act on behalf of that person. In instances of peril resulting from an accident or
medical emergency, the obligation to act on behalf of that person is similarly
acute. In both instances, the person in distress is in need of assistance.
A casual perusal of the news makes the need for this legislation acutely
clear, sometimes painfully so. The constant drumbeat of attacks, sexual and
otherwise, emphasize the role of the bystander who knows of the peril of another
and yet chooses not to act. In so doing, the bystander becomes complicit in the
consequences to the “at risk” individual.
The proposed legislation is predicated on the bystander’s physical
presence; what is presumed to be seen on social media—Facebook or other
platforms—does not impose a duty on the viewer. Given the uncertainty of
authenticity regarding events seemingly depicted on social media, extending the
duty to act in such circumstances is unwieldly, practically, and legally
impractical.
The low bar—dialing 911—imposes a minimal duty on the bystander.
There is no demand or expectation, that the bystander physically intervene,
whether providing medical assistance or separating individuals involved in a
fight. That is not the intention as such actions may have detrimental
consequences, either from the perspective of the victim or the bystander. In
recommending minimal action, we seek to strike a careful balance: on the one
hand, alerting law enforcement; on the other hand, not exposing the bystander
to unnecessary harm.
The decision not to intervene is our primary focus. In doing so, we aim to
convince the reader of the necessity of bystander legislation, for we are of the
belief that criminalizing bystander failure to provide assistance is warranted
given the potential consequences of inaction.
C. Complicity
Integral to understanding the essence of the bystander’s failure to provide
assistance is complicity; the two—bystander and complicity—are powerfully,
often times tragically, connected. The term “complicity” is not used lightly; it
carries with it significant connotations by suggesting the bystander enables harm
to the victim and, therefore, shares some of the responsibility. Complicity is
ancient but shapes, enables, and permeates contemporary events. It is not by
chance that Dictionary.com chose “complicit” as the word of the year in 2017.9
“As 2017 comes to a close, it’s time for us to reflect on the words that impacted
all of us this year—for better or for worse,” Dictionary.com said in announcing
its decision.10 The online dictionary continued: “[t]he word complicit has sprung
up in conversations this year about those who speak out against powerful figures

9

Dictionary.com’s 2017 Word of the Year: Complicit, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.
com/e/word-of-the-year-2017/ [https://perma.cc/BU5B-JBBE].
10
Id.
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and institutions and about those who stay silent.”11
The critical word is “silent”; perhaps more than any other word, it captures
the essence of the bystander. The three words—silence, complicity, and
bystander—are essential to understanding the consequences to the victim.
Tragically, that theme has firm, historical footing: while the evil of the
perpetrators of the Holocaust has been thoroughly documented, it is equally
important to recall that without the complicity of the bystander, the Nazi regime
would not have been able to implement the Final Solution. 12
A victim is anyone suffering, be it because they find themselves the target
of a crime or due to an unfortunate accident or acute health crisis. In criminal
situations, a triangular relationship is created between the victim, perpetrator,
and bystander.

Figure 1

When the victim is in peril due to an accident or health crisis, the
relationship between victim and bystander is a straight, linear line.

Figure 2

The two constants are the presence of the victim and bystander and the
question of whether the latter alleviates the peril of the former. In proposing a
victim-oriented approach, we emphasize the consequences of the bystander’s
decision not to act.
To address these issues, this article will be divided into the following
sections: Introduction; Why Bystander Legislation: Whom are We Seeking to
Protect and What are We Seeking to Achieve; Literature Survey; Bystander
11

Amy B. Wang, ‘Complicit’ Is the 2017 Word of the Year, According to Dictionary.com, WASH.
POST (Nov. 27, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/
11/27/complicit-is-the-2017-word-of-the-year-according-to-dictionarycom/?utm_term=.3741b60d
dea5 [https://perma.cc/GYF3-MJ8T].
12
“Final Solution”— 1940 to 1945, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm
.org/information/exhibitions/museum-exhibitions/permanent/final-solution-1940-to-1945 [https://
perma.cc/3YK4-GV4K].
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Legislation Internationally and in the United States; Application of Bystander
Legislation; Our Experiences with the Legislative Process in the State of Utah;
Why is Bystander Legislation a Bad Idea?; Going Forward. Directly following
Section Seven is an Appendix with the full version of State Rep. King’s
proposed legislation.
II. WHY BYSTANDER LEGISLATION: WHOM ARE WE SEEKING TO PROTECT
AND WHAT ARE WE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE?
Efforts to legislate bystander obligation are criticized for a number of
reasons reflecting the complexity and controversy inherent in criminalizing most
(but not all) inactions.13 In broad-brush, to be examined in greater detail in the
sections ahead, the primary concerns regarding such legislation focus on fears
of prosecutorial abuse of discretion and a belief that bystander obligation is best
framed as a moral, rather than a legal, duty. As we shall explain, we beg to differ
with these and other concerns raised by proposal opponents. In doing so, we
remind readers that our primary focus is on the person in peril, in need of
immediate assistance.
The notion of limited duty reflects both political consideration/reality and
recognition that a bystander who seeks to do “too much” may, unintentionally,
cause harm to the individual in peril. While “Good Samaritan” legislation
protects the intervening bystander from legal liability if, in an effort to provide
assistance, harm was caused, our analysis is to be distinguished. We do not rely
on Good Samaritan legislation in advocating imposing a legal duty on the
bystander to act, for we believe the two to be unrelated.
In not requiring actual, physical intervention by the bystander, the proposed
model reflects a deliberate effort to strike a careful balance: on the one hand
requiring action while, on the other hand, doing so in a manner intended both to
minimize risk to the bystander and potential injury to the person in peril. The
proposed legislation attempts to strike an applicable/implementable balance
between the two individuals who have, regardless of circumstances and
conditions, been brought together and share the same space, where the actions
of one individual are essential to the welfare of another individual. The sharing
of that same space—the physicality of the relationship between the bystander
and person in peril—is, for both individuals, a tenuous connection with
potentially significant consequences. It is for that reason that the recommended
duty is minimal. Nevertheless, provided the bystander meets a two-part test
comprised of knowledge and capability, not imposing an obligation to act further
enhances the predicament of the individual in distress.
The broader question and more fundamental inquiry is why impose a legal
duty rather than relying on a moral foundation reflecting core values of
humanity, basic respect, and decency amongst individuals? After all, as the oftquoted phrase suggests, “we know to do the right thing,” or as was argued in the
13

See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law, 88 GEO. L.J.
105, 108 (1999).

2020

GUIORA & DYER: BYSTANDER LEGISLATION

297

Utah State Legislature, “we in Utah are good people.” These arguments are
cloaked in anecdotal evidence, community myths, and time-worn clichés.
While, doubtlessly, there are numerous examples of individuals acting on
behalf of another in distress, to suggest that is a cultural norm reflecting
consistent normative values and behavior is inaccurate. More than that, that oftstated assumption—or perhaps more accurately a reflexive reaction—does not
reflect the reality of contemporary society. To rely on the quaint notion that the
right thing will be done is “fool’s gold” and does not, in the main, provide
protection to the individual in distress.
What, then, does bystander obligation legislation seek to achieve that
cannot be otherwise attained? More than that, does the presumed benefit of
bystander obligation legislation outweigh the costs and consequences of
punishing a crime of omission? The primary motivation for the legislative
proposal is two-fold: to punish the bystander who fails to provide assistance and
to encourage future bystanders to act on behalf of the person in peril. Legislating
this obligation is intended to impose a duty that is otherwise not codified, albeit
the opposition to criminalizing omission. However, the discomfort that “crimes
of omission” inevitably conjure must be weighed against the benefit—to the
person in peril—by codifying this duty.
This cost-benefit analysis is integral to understanding the importance and
relevance of bystander legislation. Imposing the duty to act, particularly when
there is no pre-existing relationship between the person in peril and the
bystander, suggests a re-articulation of the Social Contract, for it extends the
duty one member of society owes to another. This is distinct from, and in
addition to, the Social Contract between the State and the individual as
articulated by Rousseau,14 Locke,15 and Hobbes.16
By extending duty to the bystander, the proposed legislation adds a layer of
obligation between two individuals who do not have an otherwise pre-existing
duty to each other. This is distinct from reporting obligations imposed on
teachers or health care providers to children or others who it is suspected are in
harm’s way. Similarly, this is distinct from a duty a parent owes a child or that
of a lifeguard to individuals swimming in a pool. Those duties reflect a
professional or contractual obligation, much less the primary duty of a parent or
an adult entrusted with the care of a vulnerable child. Those obligations and
duties are otherwise codified and largely self-explanatory. The failure to meet
those obligations are understandably subject to criminal penalty.
Imposing a duty where there is no pre-existing or contractual duty
significantly expands the notion of obligation. That “expansion” must be
understood in its intended context: to mitigate the peril of another individual.
14

See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATIONS OF
INEQUALITY AMONG MEN (Helena Rosenblatt ed., Beford St. Martin’s 2011) (1761).
15
See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
16
See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J. C. A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
(1651).
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The expansiveness is neither abstract nor ephemeral; rather, it is concrete with
specific purposes and practical consequences. The extension of “duty owed” to
include individuals whose “interaction”—however fleeting—may well be
premised on total randomness and happenstance is to restructure the concept of
obligation and responsibility. More than that: the two individuals—the person
in distress and the bystander—possibly do not exchange a word or glance and,
in all probability, do not know each other’s name. That, however, is irrelevant
to the duty we seek to impose on the bystander.
This is, then, a matter of trade-offs: imposition of duty on the bystander,
potentially resulting in punishment, in exchange for providing assistance, of a
limited nature, to a person in distress. The proposed duty—limited to dialing
911—intends to fill an important gap in the criminal code of a number of
jurisdictions.
III. LITERATURE SURVEY
Under the common law, there is no legal duty to act on behalf of anyone in
peril. Scholarly discussions have reached different conclusions regarding the
merits of creating such a legislative requirement.17
Those who favor the common law tradition argue that imposing liability for
failing to prevent harm runs contrary to principles of personal autonomy.18 This
argument focuses on the difference between directly causing harm and simply
failing to prevent it.19 That is, our criminal law system requires an element of
causation in order to respect one’s personal autonomy; we are responsible for
the consequences of our own actions but not the actions of others. Here, the fear
is that duty to assist laws will “strong arm individuals to act in situations where
their conscience should be their guides.”20
The inverse criticism of bystander liability argues that it does not materially
affect behavior and is thus not worth pursuing. Scholars point to existing
legislation, arguing that the laws on the books have not been enforced with any
regularity or consistency.21 This view dismisses the idea of bystander liability,
describing duty to assist laws as “easily made but rarely enforced.”22
The relationship between a bystander’s ability and decision to assist has
evolved with the rising power of social media and overall technological

17

Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of
Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 387 (1998); Arthur Alan
Severance, The Duty to Render Assistance in the Satellite Age, 36 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 377, 399
(2006); Patricia Grande Montana, Watch or Report? Livestream or Help? Good Samaritan Laws
Revisited: The Need to Create a Duty to Report, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 533, 536 (2018); Marcia M.
Ziegler, Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist: The American Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 DICK. L. REV.
525, 528 (2000).
18
Ziegler, supra note 17, at 536.
19
Id.
20
Stewart, supra note 17, at 423.
21
Id. at 424.
22
Id.
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advances.23 Technology may also have created a desensitization to violence and
a decrease in empathy, which make it more likely for bystanders to pull out their
phones to film an incident rather than dial 911.24
There are arguments that statutes requiring a duty to act are ineffective and
do not materially alter behavior.25 This is based on social and physiological
research, which demonstrates that fear of prosecution does not compel action
from those who otherwise feel no responsibility to assist a stranger in peril.26
Instead, commentators claim many recent laws have been the result of emotional
public responses to violent crimes but are not based on logic or function.27 In
short, these commentators describe recent legislative action as “feel good
legislation,” which ignores possible adverse consequences and will not actually
make a difference in the frequency of a particular crime.28
Citing this lack of effectiveness, critics pose various possible adverse
consequences and insist that they outweigh any benefit. One difficulty may lie
in evaluating whether someone is genuinely in danger or the degree to which an
easy rescue is possible, which may, in turn, result in unjust convictions.29
Another consequence may arise from a vague statute that could allow
prosecutors to bring frivolous charges and allow convictions to be based on the
“public moral outrage.”30
A separate criticism is that an affirmative duty to act may encourage
reckless attempts to rescue victims of crime. 31 Critics assert that this will only
exacerbate the situation by putting the would-be-rescuer in just as much danger
as the victim.32 Under this view, preventing crime is best left to law enforcement
professionals.33
Further concerns focus on potential adverse consequences for those
providing assistance. A legal requirement to assist could result in personal
consequences in the form of legal retribution for failing to comply with that duty,
or injury from voluntarily engaging in a dangerous situation.34 It is difficult for
some critics to accept the idea that there are individuals who should face
consequences for their inaction.35 The general theme underlying these concerns
23

Montana, supra note 17, at 536.
Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 68, 76
(2017).
25
Justin T. King, Criminal Law: “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?” Sherrice’s Law: A Balance of
American Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 628 (1999).
26
Stewart, supra note 17, at 428.
27
Id. at 422.
28
Id.
29
Jay Logan Rogers, Testing the Waters for an Arizona Duty-to-Rescue Law, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 897,
907 (2014).
30
Id. at 910.
31
Id. at 908–09.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 909.
34
Andrew D. Kaplan, “Cash-Ing Out”: Regulating Omissions, Analysis of the Sherrice Iverson
Act, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 67, 82 (2000).
35
Id.
24
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is that bystander legislation diminishes free agency and that an individual should
only be held accountable for their affirmative actions. 36
Scholars have also argued that “duty-to-assist laws ‘go beyond the
appropriate realm of criminal liability and into the sphere of moral
accountability.’”37 Under this view, an encouragement of altruistic behavior is
the answer.38 Such scholars point to “the moral compass,” arguing that people
in our society feel an obligation to help those in need, and that such behavior
need not be legally mandated.39 Instead, the requirement to extend assistance to
others should be forwarded by other social institutions, such as religion. This
commentary asserts that the moral duty to assist will continue to be enforced by
the potential reproach of “good people” in our society. 40
In contrast, other scholars take issue with the rigid nature of the law that
prevents imposing liability on those who witness crime and do nothing.41 These
commentators support bystander liability and make various arguments to
forward their claims. One obvious argument is that such laws provide an
incentive to help strangers in peril, which will prevent crime and protect
victims.42 Further, some argue that duty to assist laws reflect the general views
of our society.43
For example, Marcia M. Ziegler urges legislatures around the country to
create a uniform duty to assist law consistent with what society already considers
reasonable.44 She asserts that the traditional rule eliminating liability for “failing
to act” operates as an exception to the widespread duty to act as a reasonably
prudent person would under the circumstances. 45 That is, the lack of a duty to
assist is essentially a “get out of jail free” pass that operates contrary to society’s
collective sense of morality and logic.46 Ziegler proposes statutory language that
would codify what society already considers reasonable to put unreasonable
people on notice that their behavior is likely to result in liability. 47 She argues
that duty to assist statutes have the potential to prevent suffering and, at the very
least, would create liability for those who are responsible.48
Proponents of this view note that the law already imposes an affirmative
duty to act in various situations, reflecting society’s views. Those duties are
designed to prevent instances such as drunk driving deaths and child abuse and

36

Id. at 71.
Stewart, supra note 17, at 433.
38
Id. at 432–33.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Breanna Trombley, Criminal Law—No Stitches for Snitches: The Need for a Duty-to-Report Law
in Arkansas, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 813, 815–16 (2012).
42
Rogers, supra note 29, at 902.
43
Id. at 903.
44
Ziegler, supra note 17, at 556.
45
Id. at 539.
46
Id. at 555.
47
Id. at 556.
48
Id. at 559–60.
37

2020

GUIORA & DYER: BYSTANDER LEGISLATION

301

to make sure people enforce and respect pre-existing contractual agreements. 49
Essentially, the argument is that laws already exist and have evolved to impose
duties to behave in a way that conforms to societal standards; therefore, no
further legislative adjustments are required.
Commentators also suggest that many of the adverse consequences posed
by critics may be mitigated by the language of the statute. For example, most of
the relevant statutes contain exceptions that apply in circumstances where
assistance would cause danger for the person providing assistance or for third
parties.50 Some also note that the duty imposed can be very narrow. One way to
narrow the statute would be to explicitly state that it would apply only in
situations where the bystander knows that a person is exposed to or has suffered
grave physical harm.51
Other ways in which bystander legislation can, and has, been limited is
through language which specifies that the duty will be fulfilled by simply
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel, such as
simply dialing 911.52 Language which narrows such legislation has also focused
on created limits to the potential liability for those who violate the duty to assist.
There are suggestions that bystander statutes should specifically limit the
possible liability to low level offenses or the imposition of small fines. 53 In other
words, the idea is to create a statute that acts as “more of a nudge than a shove.”54
IV. BYSTANDER LEGISLATION INTERNATIONALLY AND IN THE UNITED
STATES
Some states and several countries, despite their differing legal structures
and historical backgrounds, have arrived at similar conclusions: that their society
would benefit from the implementation of some form of bystander legislation.
The American legal system traces its roots to the early seventeenth century,
when English settlers brought the common law and practices of the English
system.55 England has of yet, never codified a duty to assist, refusing to place a
legal liability upon the failure to act.
In writing the majority opinion for the House of Lords (comparable to an
American Court of Appeals), Lord Hoffman addressed the types of duties that
individuals, acting as members of society, owe to one another:
One can put the matter in political, moral or economic terms. In
political terms it is less of an invasion of an individual’s freedom for
the law to require him to consider the safety of others in his actions
49

Id. at 555.
Rogers, supra note 29, at 918–19.
51
Id. at 919.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 920.
55
Selena E. Molina, The Roots of Our Legal System: The Foundation for Growth, A.B.A. (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/legal-history/roots-ou
r-legal-system-foundation-growth/ [https://perma.cc/W3WS-8UL3].
50
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than to impose upon him a duty to rescue or protect. A moral version
of this point may be called the ‘Why pick on me?’ argument.56
The American judiciary chose to follow English precedence. Courts will
only recognize that bystanders have certain duties: imposed legislatively;
contractually; situations where parties have a special relationship to one another;
or in instances where an individual creates a hazardous situation that places
another individual in danger, which would place a duty to rescue upon the
individual who created the hazard.57
In 1898, New Hampshire’s Chief Justice of the Supreme Court articulated
the common law standard with the following illustrative scenario:
Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two-year-old babe on
the track, and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with
entire safety to himself, and the instincts of humanity require him to
do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless
savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the
child’s injury, or indictable under the statute for its death.58
The Chief Justice was correct, and while the court of moral opinion might
label a man who declines to save a child’s life as a “monster,” the “mere moral
obligation” to act is outside the scope of traditional legally reprehensible civil or
criminal behavior.59
For decades, it remained true that “[n]o action will lie against a spiteful
man, who, seeing another running into danger, merely omits to warn him.”60
Then, in 1967, Vermont became the first state to pass bystander legislation, and
other states shortly began to follow suit. In a little over three decades, ten states
passed duty to assist laws. The strength and subject matter of these laws vary
from state to state.
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Figure 361

Of the states that have imposed an affirmative duty upon bystanders, with
no relation to the victim, only four have broad duty to assist laws that require
action by any person at the scene of any emergency, regardless of the crime, or
the victim.62 Vermont’s innovative legislation has some of the broadest statutory
language:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical
harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger
or peril to himself or herself or without interference with important
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed
person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with
subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless
his or her acts constitute gross negligence or unless he or she will
receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in this
subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a
practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary
course of his or her practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall

61

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1970);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1983); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.027 (West 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (West 1984); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-56-1 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 18 (West 1985); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-1-5.1 (West 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2000).
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be fined not more than $100.00.63
The six states with limited bystander legislation have statutory language
that limits its application to either a specific category of victim or a specific type
of crime.

Figure 464

Florida’s statute, for example, criminalizes only the failure to report sexual
battery while remaining silent about those who choose to ignore victims facing
any other form of peril.65 In 2017, a handicapped adult male drowned in Florida
while a group of teens mocked him and filmed him on their cell phones; once
the man stopped struggling and failed to resurface, the onlookers remarked “oh
he just died” and departed the scene that was no longer entertaining, and
uploaded the video to the internet, no doubt to gain some notoriety with a viral
63

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967).
See generally Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILDREN’S BUREAU (Apr.
2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7CB-XDZV]; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1970); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1983); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.027 (West 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (West 1984); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-56-1 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 18 (West 1985); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS
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video.66 No Florida law was broken.
In 1997, in Las Vegas, nineteen-year-old David Cash Jr. watched his friend
sexually assault seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson in a public restroom. 67 When
Cash later asked his friend what happened to the child, his friend said he had
killed her.68 Cash never reported the rape and murder of the child.69 Sherrice’s
mother began a petition, asking authorities to hold Cash legally accountable for
his inaction.70 The district attorney assigned to the case stated that, regrettably,
she could not hold Cash accountable in a court of law; only the court of public
opinion could render judgment.71
Sherrice’s murder—and other acts of violence towards children—brings
into question the capacity of safeguards that may or may not exist in each
jurisdiction. Every state has created a list of professionals who are legally
mandated to report the neglect or abuse of a child.72 States differ when it comes
to which bystanders must act when they know that a child is being abused or
neglected. Some legislation has language where others may report child abuse,
and others where individuals must report child abuse.73
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Do You Have to Rescue Someone in Danger?, supra note 3; CBS Worldwide, Inc., The Bad
Samaritan Part 1 of 2 (1998), YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqTd
XOQmXrc [https://perma. cc/EF46-E8PE].
67
Don Terry, Mother Rages Against Indifference, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 1998), https://www.ny
times.com/1998/08/24/us/mother-rages-against-indifference.html [https://perma.cc/7A2S-68Q5].
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Below is a map of the states with a “may report” legal standard:74

Figure 5

In each of the gray states, there is no legal requirement for an individual to
report the neglect or abuse of a child if that individual has no identifiable
relationship to that child.75 In other words, Cash would still face no legal
consequences for his role in the murder of Sherrice Iverson in any of these states.
Variations of legal requirements for bystanders to assist individuals in
distress have been enacted in Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia.76
Legislation in each country differs in its construction as well as its
application. One example is French Penal Code 223-6, which reads:
Any person who willfully abstains from rendering assistance to a
person in peril when he or she could have rendered that assistance
without risk to himself, herself, or others, either by acting personally
or by calling for aid, is liable to the same penalties [i.e., five years
imprisonment and a 500,000 francs fine].77
An example of bystander legislation application arose from an incident that
took place in October 2016, when an eighty-three-year-old man collapsed at the
74
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entryway of a bank in Germany and not one, not two, but three people stepped
over the man to use the ATM.78 The incident was captured by a surveillance
camera and was used in court to show the indifference bystanders showed
towards the elderly man, who died a week after his collapse at the bank.79 The
three bystanders were convicted and required to pay fines, ranging from $2,900
to $4,300, for failing to assist the man, which was a direct violation of German
law.80 By holding these individuals accountable for their callous indifference,
Germany sent a message to all its citizens that they are held to a higher standard;
if there is suffering and something can be done, something should be done.
V. APPLICATION OF BYSTANDER LEGISLATION
Two contrasting criticisms of bystander legislation address its application:
it will lead to a flood of litigation, and, if the crime is indeed difficult to prove,
no one will be charged under the statute making its enactment a waste of time.
The inherent complication with answering these types of questions is that there
is no single system, nationally or at the state level, that can track how and when
a certain piece of legislation is used. Therefore, in an attempt to address whether
either of these criticisms have merit, we contacted approximately 450
courthouses from the ten states that have such legislation.
Less than half of these courthouses responded; approximately sixty percent
of those who responded indicated that their system could not access the
requested information.81 However, from the courthouses that could access the
information, almost no instances were reported of individuals being charged
under their state’s bystander legislation. The few instances where individuals
were charged with failure to report indicates that the legislation has not proven
useless while also affirming that, following its enactment, it did not lead to an
untenable amount of litigation.
We also used a broader method to analyze the frequency of legislation use
by examining all reported cases on Lexis and Westlaw. The limitations with this
method are that each site only lists those appellate cases which have been
reported. The following information was gathered from the two websites: 82
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Cassandra Santiago & Stephanie Halasz, Germany Convicts 3 for Not Helping an Elderly Man
Who Collapsed, CNN (Sept. 19, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/europe/
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Figure 6

The scarce number of appellate cases may be an indication that the
ramifications are so insignificant that individuals would rather not waste time
and money to appeal, that there are not many prosecutions to begin with, or that
the prosecutions under these laws are only undertaken when there is extremely
solid evidence and high likelihood of conviction.
The approaches that Courts have taken when addressing these cases are
more crucial to understanding this type of legislation than the percentages of use
or frequencies of litigation. Legislators have indicated that amongst their biggest
concerns with bystander legislation is its application. 83 The type of impact that
legislation will have on a community is vitally important, and, for some
legislators, it is the only factor worthy of consideration when discussing newly
proposed bills.84
In assessing the impact that a specific legislation has had, the traditional
approach is to look at court cases and scholarly assessments. The application of
duty to assist legislation has proved difficult to analyze for two reasons. First,
83

Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4.
84
Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4.
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there are only ten states with duty to assist legislation, with varying degrees of
coverage, and many have only been on the books for a few decades;85 therefore,
case law is limited on this subject. Secondly, due to the lack of cases available
to analyze, most scholarly works can only address the subject from a theoretical
perspective.
Specific applications of these statutes by courts has proven to be the best
indicator of their real-world effect. Misinterpretation of these statutes often has
individuals imagining that it requires direct intervention of bystanders.86 The
Supreme Court of Vermont specifically indicated that their duty to assist “does
not create a duty to intervene in a fight.”87 If the situation presents “danger or
peril” to the rescuer, then Vermont’s statute prevents a duty from arising. 88
In Washington, the attempt to elevate the failure to report a violent offense
to support a manslaughter charge was rejected by the State Supreme Court.89
Such legislation was used to increase criminal charges in Hawaii after two-yearold Natasha was beaten and then later succumbed to her wounds because neither
her mother, nor her mother’s boyfriend, sought medical assistance. 90 The
circumstances surrounding Natasha’s death made it difficult to tie a specific
individual to her injuries as the defendants claimed that several individuals had
access to, and could have beaten, the child on the day that she died. 91 Unable to
tie Natasha’s injuries to an individual’s affirmative actions, the court held that
the mother and boyfriend, who knew of the child’s condition and failed to obtain
medical care, recklessly caused the child’s death.92
In every state, parents are statutorily bound to protect their children and
seek medical attention when necessary;93 however, the mother’s boyfriend had
no legal connection to the child. Absent additional statutory requirements, the
boyfriend would have gone free, despite proof he knew the child was in critical
condition and evidence to suggest that he likely had a hand in inflicting those
injuries. Hawaii passed legislation twenty years prior to the incident which
provides that “[a]ny person at the scene of a crime who knows that a victim of
the crime is suffering from serious physical harm shall obtain or attempt to
obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel.”94 The boyfriend’s
85
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attempt to escape liability failed and, despite his sentence being lessened due to
an absence of evidence of criminal commissions, was punished for his criminal
commissions.95
Given the importance of the effect that legislation has on a community, it
is critical to include in the discussion any instances where similar laws have been
enforced in other jurisdictions before passing new laws. These discussions
themselves often help courts determine the manner in which a statute should be
interpreted because, if there is uncertainty as to a statute’s meaning, justices may
look to “the legislative history of the measures and statements” by those who
were in charge of the statute during its consideration.96 Careful craftmanship and
thoughtful conversation is perhaps the singularly best way to ensure that new
legislation is used exclusively in situations for which it was designed.
VI. OUR EXPERIENCES WITH THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE STATE OF
UTAH
While the Utah Legislature has yet to ratify State Rep. King’s “911
Responsibilities in an Emergency” legislation,97 our experiences shed invaluable
light on the complexity of the legislative process with matters that intersect
morality and legality. It is that complicated space that the question of bystander
duty occupies; there is a sense of “cross-over” that casts doubt for some
legislators on the viability of legislating what some refer to as “the right thing to
do.” While other arguments were voiced in opposition to the proposed
legislation, it is this question—more than any other—that raises the greatest
concern for legislators. The question is “why?”, and what do we learn from that?
In focusing on the morality-legality confluence, it seems that a preliminary
question that is glossed over, yet deserves our utmost attention since it is the
core of the proposal, is how to frame the duty owed by person A to person B
when there is no pre-existing relationship or otherwise legislated duty. This
requires the creation of a duty between two individuals who do not know each
other, when the person in peril is neither a child nor elderly. This caveat is
relevant because in Utah, duty laws were enacted by the legislature applying to
vulnerable children and the elderly.98
State Rep. King’s legislation can be perceived as an “add-on” to duty
requirements that the Legislature previously codified. It is that “extra step”—
extending existing obligations—that has proven particularly vexing. State Rep.
King’s legislation would extend the existing duty requirement—a seemingly
logical measure—to a category not presently defined as vulnerable: individuals
in peril, incapable of the simple act of dialing 911, as that is the sole obligation
State Rep. King’s legislation imposes on the bystander.
The victim—presently outside existing protected categories of children or
the elderly—has no special characteristics and no connection to the person
95
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positioned to provide the minimal assistance to alleviate the peril. In other
words, there is neither a pre-existing duty nor a pre-existing relationship between
the victim and the person positioned to alleviate distress. The intent of State Rep.
King’s legislation to protect falls into a space outside specially designated and
protected zones. It is that category, devoid of special characteristics and unique
qualities, that—as we learned over the past two years during meetings,
discussions, and hearings—has proved the most challenging for legislators to
recognize as also being vulnerable and in need of assistance when in peril. That,
for lack of a better term, “middle category,” if not in peril at a particular moment
would not require assistance is one that the legislature has proved unwilling to
impose as a requirement on the bystander to intervene on their behalf when
circumstances clearly dictate “help needed.”
While legislators acknowledge there are instances when individuals in
distress require assistance, they reference the “right thing to do” argument,
reflecting a conclusion that the bystander will be sufficiently morally
grounded.99 It is an argument, actually a refrain, that seemingly “soothes the
soul” of the speaker, reflecting a belief in the basic goodness of humanity, and
assuming that victims in peril can rely on this model. Similarly, those that
ascribe to this school of thought reject the notion of punishment and deterrence;
after all, if the requirement is perceived solely through the lens of morality, then
there are no consequences or accountability for failure to act. The failure to adopt
a mechanism whereby the bystander who fails to intervene is punished for doing
so fails both the immediate victim and future victims.
The resistance from a majority of Utah legislators over the past two years
requires us to address the following question: who is deserving of protection? If
it is the victim, then the most obvious way to do so is to impose a legal
requirement with criminal penalty; if it is the bystander, then failure to ratify
State Rep. King’s legislation ensures adoption of a bystander protection model.
It is unclear why members of the Legislature would prefer protecting the able
rather than extending protection to the vulnerable.
In the context of the “duty” question, the legislature has clearly laid down
its marker: the “moral” bystander will “know what to do,” and if that does not
occur, then the victim will not be relieved of peril and there will be no
consequences for walking away. Consequently, the Utah legislature has signaled
that failing to provide assistance will be consequence free and the victim will be
left to their own devices. In other words, legislators extend protection to the
individual who fails to act on behalf of another member of society who needs
assistance. This seems to be a sense of duty turned on its head: should not the
primary focus of the Legislature be to extend protections to the weak, rather than
the strong? After all, “in the moment,” it is the victim who is weak and the
bystander who is “strong.”
In the debate before the House Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2018,
one State Representative focused on the idea that this legislation was a “18099
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degree turn” from a legal standard that potentially has been in place “since the
beginning of time,”100 and framed the issue in the following manner:
So, my question is, what is the compelling policy argument for
changing a law that has essentially existed forever? You had suggested
maybe so that we could mitigate the likelihood of crime or loss of life,
but we’re becoming a safer, less violent, nation all the time, it seems
those arguments would fit more 100 years ago, or 200 years ago, or
back in old England, in places and times when people were literally
dying in the street and others walked by. We didn’t do it then; we’ve
resisted it until now.101
Another State Representative echoed similar concerns:
The challenge we have as legislators, as lawmakers, is do we take the
moral imperative that most of us feel and now do we make it a legal
imperative that has legal consequences? I’m not arguing with you
about the fact that it is good, and it is the right thing, but we also try to
be careful, and we recognize that words have meaning, and we also
recognize as we sit here, that it’s very difficult to anticipate all of the
consequences as a result of passage.102
This same State Representative also voiced concern over the type and weight of
the liability that such legislation may present: “I do believe it also does set a
standard, because we’re saying to the people of the state, ‘if you fail to act in
these situations, you’re criminally liable.’ Well clearly if I’m criminally liable I
have a civil duty as well.”103
During the House floor debate on February 19, 2019, a third State
Representative made a similar argument, delving into the second issue, which
has been a significant source of concern for some legislators, and criminalizing
the failure to act thereby legislating a “crime of omission”:
Traditionally under criminal law, as the prior representative noted, the
criminal law requires a criminal act, and criminal intent. Here we are
criminalizing doing nothing, we are criminalizing inaction. Now
references made to our current law where we have a duty to report
abuse of children or abuse of the elderly, we make those exceptions in
the law because of the distinct and unique vulnerability of children and
elderly. This law, this bill rather, would open up that liability to society
at large, to everyone, not just children and elderly but anyone who is
in distress. And we impose a duty to report. That is a big leap, it is a
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big leap for us to take in our law.104
The State Representative then referenced the murder of Sherrice Iverson
and how it piqued his interest concerning Cash’s liability under Utah law:
I did locate under Utah law, under existing law, section 76-2-202. It is
our accomplice liability statute it says that anyone who “intentionally
aids another person to engage in a crime can also be criminally liable
for that crime.” Intentionally aids, the case law in Utah, I read a few
of the cases, how is that interpreted, aiding [sic] you’re considered to
aid in a crime, if you stand by and do nothing. And so, for example, in
the case of State v. Cheney, a man was held liable under the
accomplice liability statute for allowing his child to be raped. In the
case of State v. Beltran-Felix, it was a case of a sexual assault where
two men entered into a store, one of the men raped one of the women
who was there while the other friend watched, or waited, allowing the
crime to occur without intervention, and the observing friend was held
liable for aiding his friend in the commission of a crime.105
While voicing his concern that criminalizing acts of omission would be a
drastic departure from current legislature, the State Representative
simultaneously made the argument that current Utah law does just that: “We
have an existing law that allows those who do nothing in these situations where
a crime is being occurred, where someone is in need, we allow them to be
prosecuted as an accomplice.”106
After expressing that he appreciated the idea of sending a message that
everyone should step up and be good Samaritans, one State Representative on
the Floor Debate in February 2018 commented as follows:
I don’t like the idea of legislating goodness. I think it’s been mentioned
before but the good people of Utah do reach out and I don’t see that
there’s a problem. Maybe it’ll require a few more, maybe we’ll get a
few more reports, but I worry more about the chilling effect that it
might have.107
Along with other opponents to the bill, this State Representative was
apprehensive about deviating from the status quo:
. . . it’s just such a departure from our criminal code and our law,
without any mens rea or action on your part, you can become a
criminal by your inaction. While I recognize the need for vulnerable
adults and our youth, I don’t think we should take it to the extent that
104

911 Responsibilities in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4 (statement of Rep.
Merrill Nelson).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Kelly
Miles).

314

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

Vol. XXIX:2

this law does.108
What these four Representatives articulated—in the 2018 and 2019
Committee and Floor debates—highlights the principled reservations with the
legislation. In a nutshell, the four State Representatives are expressing two
separate but perhaps related concerns: imposing a legal duty to act on behalf of
the bystander and penalizing the crime of omission. These issues—whether
viewed separately or jointly—present the most compelling reason to vote against
the legislation.
These concerns were oft-heard refrains when State Rep. King and the
authors met with members of the Utah legislature; in some ways, it became a
mantra for those opposing the proposed legislation. The question is what the
source of this concern is and how best to overcome it.
Extending the “duty to act” necessarily focuses on the consequences of
imposing a relationship between individuals where, otherwise, none exists. This
is distinct from the relationship between an individual and the state in which the
“duty” question is predicated on a contractual relationship. The discomfort
expressed regarding the temporary-transient-fleeting relationship State Rep.
King recommends focuses on the risks in creating an obligation between two
individuals where one would not, otherwise, exist.
The Members of the Legislature prefer this duty be contained to a moralitymoral “boundary” rather than extension to the terrain of the law. That is, though
recognizing that the person in distress would benefit from bystander
intervention, criminalizing the failure or omission reflects government over-step
in demanding particular actions. This argument is, frankly, bystander-focused
rather than victim-centered.
That is the essence of the disagreement, highlighting distinct means of
addressing the existential question of duty. By limiting it to an inquiry of moral
values, framed in the traditional “we know to do the right thing,” we are leaving
an individual in peril to the good graces of another. In the inherently limited
paradigm, should the bystander not intervene—limited to “dialing 911”—then
there are three, if not four, results: no assistance to a victim, no punishment to
the bystander for failing to provide assistance, and no deterrence to future
bystanders, thereby arguably failing to provide assistance to future victims.
From the perspective of present and future victims, this suggests a profound
failure in their hour of need. It is, more than anything, abandonment
compounded by a knowing, and deliberate, determination not to punish the
bystander positioned to act.
While one assumes those legislators do not wish ill on the victim, the
practical result of their opposition leads to that very result, whether intended or
not. The hesitation to and recoil from legislating a crime of omission has the
same consequence from the victim’s perspective. More than that, criminal codes,
including Utah’s, include crimes of omission; two obvious examples are
108
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punishment for failing to stop at a stop sign and failure to pay taxes. In both
situations, the legislature determined that the act of omission is punishable in a
court of law.
Thus, the question is why these four State Representatives find creating a
crime of omission so objectionable when the sole purpose of State Rep. King’s
legislation is to minimize harm to a vulnerable member of society. After all, that
is the underlying basis for the proposal. Crimes of omission are intended to
punish for a failure; is not walking away from a person in peril a failure? Therein
appears the crux of the dilemma: what State Rep. King frames as a criminal
failure, his peers perceive a moral failing. The division is profound; one suggests
tolerating abandoning the victim, and the other would impose a criminal penalty.
These, then, are two distinct approaches to the age old saying, “am I my
Brother’s keeper”:109 who do we protect and what are the consequences of
failing to create an accountability-predicated mechanism whereby minimal
intervention is required, and omission is criminalized. The concerns articulated
by the four State Representatives suggest that protection is to be extended to the
bystander; the proposal introduced by State Rep. King proposes protecting the
victim.
These are two distinct approaches to a critical societal question that
intersects distinct disciplines. The morality-based approach extends protection
to the non-intervening bystander; the legal based approach criminalizes that nonintervention. From the perspective of the victim—the person most in need of
assistance—the failure to impose a requirement to intervene escalates the peril
which, frankly, would seem to be the very antithesis of how the parable is
intended to be answered.
VII. WHY IS BYSTANDER LEGISLATION A BAD IDEA?
After listening to Utah legislators and cataloging other discussions of
bystander legislation, the most frequent criticisms are summarized below.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors are given a generous amount of discretion when it comes to
deciding whether to prosecute. It has been well established that so long as a
prosecutor does not base their decision to prosecute on an impermissible factor
then there is no violation of due process.110
Although a prosecutor obviously cannot base charging decisions on a
defendant’s race, sex, religion, or exercise of a statutory or
constitutional right, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file . . .
109
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generally rests entirely in his discretion.111
When facing criminal charges, it justifiably makes a defendant uneasy that
their case largely rests with an individual who can decide to bring charges based
upon numerous factors. The system allows prosecutors to operate without
judicial interference and narrows the review of a prosecutor’s exercise of
discretion in scope.112
Concern over prosecutorial misconduct has risen over the past few decades;
however, this is not likely due to a rise in increasing prosecutorial misconduct
and more likely the result of increasing media coverage of it. 113 The increasing
concern of prosecutorial misconduct has been met with a shift in regulations that
are aimed towards great legal and political accountability for prosecutors. 114
Prosecutors already must “consider three sets of reasons to decline or
pursue charges: legal reasons, administrative reasons, and equitable reasons.” 115
When gathering data from the ten states that have some form of bystander
legislation, there was no evidence that crimes which arose under these statutes
were being routinely prosecuted. This may be because factual findings to support
that an individual willfully declined to assist an individual in crisis are difficult
to establish.
The prosecutor’s office likely thinks that a successful prosecutor is one who
“works quickly, disposing of as many cases as possible through plea
bargains.”116 The criminal penalty in most states for failure to assist only
amounts to a misdemeanor, and, absent a clear path to conviction, it would
appear that prosecutors are more inclined to quickly move on to more pressing
matters. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has stated that prosecutors have a
duty to examine each matter with “care and accuracy.”117 Prosecutors must keep
in mind the relative importance to their community when determining which
cases to prosecute, while also weighing the chances of success.118 It simply is
not feasible for prosecutors to prosecute every matter brought before them.
Failure to assist cases are unlikely to be prioritized by prosecutors unless they
are confident they can establish every criminal element, which is difficult to do
under such statutes, or if it is a matter of high importance to the community.
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B. Legislating Morality
When attempting to pass bystander legislation through Utah’s legislature,
the notion that this is simply an attempt to legislate morality was commonly
voiced by state representatives.119 This is not a new concern and has been stated
many times in various ways:
It is, indeed, most highly desirable that [people] should not merely
abstain from doing harm to their neighbors, but should render active
services to their neighbors. In general however the penal law must
content itself with keeping [individuals] from doing positive harm, and
must leave to public opinion, and to the teachers of morality and
religion, the office of furnishing [people] with motives for doing
positive good.120
While some balk at the idea of legislating morality, it should not be
forgotten that, for the first century following the establishment of the United
States, courts consistently upheld moral legislation against constitutional
challenges.121 Even in recent years, congressional legislation has been upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court primarily for the moral implications of the bill. 122 When
thinking of the origins of any legislation, it seems difficult to imagine that any
were created without referencing some moral code. A precise definition of
morality is difficult; however, in determining whether morality is a legitimate
government interest, one scholar defined it as “a set of normative principles
about: (1) how humans should properly conduct themselves; and (2) how
humans should treat one another, whether acting singularly or in the
aggregate.”123
Compare this to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “law” as: “[t]he
regime that orders human activities and relations through systematic application
of the force of politically organized society, or through social pressure, backed
by force, in such a society; the legal system.”124
The overlap between morality and law is unmistakable. Law does have
added pressures and is backed by force, but it seems a reasonable assumption
that law is derived from moral considerations. If all proposed changes to
legislation were met with the question—“isn’t this just legislating morality?”—
it would greatly hamper a legislative process, which is already oft complained
of as being too slow. This criticism should rightly be ignored so that the merits
of the proposed legislative changes have time to be thoroughly discussed and
119
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vetted before being approved or rejected.
C. Creation of a “Nanny State”
“Nanny state” is a pejorative term referring to “a government that
overregulates its citizens by interfering with individual choice.”125 The term has
been used to describe Michael Bloomberg’s mayoral efforts to increase healthy
standards of living through restricting the sale of large soft drinks along with
regulating sodium and trans fats.126
While nanny state is typically used as a criticism, the term does not
necessarily connote an adverse system. Regulations are meant to reduce the
negative impact of “externalities,” or more plainly: “if those imposing costs on
others are forced to pay for these costs, society will get the socially optimal
amount of the activity generating the costs.”127 The troublesome version appears
where regulators create legislation that is meant to improve the life of an
individual while disregarding any costs others may experience.128 This type of
regulation has been described as “the interference . . . with another person,
against their will, and justified by a claim that the person interfered with will be
better off.”129
D. Extra Burden on Emergency Service Personnel
An inordinate burden on emergency services has been raised as a potential
unintended side effect to bystander legislation. This may be an issue that cannot
be addressed as a whole as each jurisdiction and municipality has different
resources available to provide such public necessities.
During the process of attempting to pass bystander legislation in Utah, an
active fire fighter and president of the Professional Fire Fighters of Utah—an
organization comprised of firefighters throughout the state—testified in favor of
the legislation.130 He acknowledged that it would mean an increase in calls, but
that firefighters are not afraid of work.131 Testifying as a firefighter who, from
his estimations, goes on thousands of emergency calls a year, he stated that there
were numerous times he had arrived at a scene only to wish that 911 had been
called sooner.132
Each city, county, and state must look at the adequacy of their emergency
systems. This should be done regardless of bystander legislation. Advancements
in technology will only make responding to emergency calls more efficient and
125
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ease the burdens that individuals who deal with emergency situations face every
day.
The best way to determine the potential effects that bystander legislation
may have on emergency service personnel would be to ascertain whether there
was a negative impact on the ten states previously mentioned after they enacted
such legislation. Differing forms of bystander legislation have been passed since
1967, and there has been no data to suggest that those who provide emergency
services have experienced any adverse impacts.
E. Creates the Possibility of Extra Criminal Liability
Many criminal statutes consider as a general rule that “a person is guilty of
involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act
in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a
reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.”133
If there is a legally required duty to assist, then it could become an
“unlawful act” not to assist. Further, if someone were to die due to a person’s
inaction, that person could be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Those already hesitant about creating criminal liability for inaction become
much more prone to objection at the idea that such a law could be used as a basis
for heightening criminal liability. Concern over heightened criminal liability has
not gone unnoticed by legislators. In 2019, State Rep. King introduced duty to
assist legislation that addressed this concern. The language in State Rep. King’s
proposed bill was as follows: “[n]otwithstanding any contrary provision of state
law, a prosecutor may not use an individual’s violation of Subsection (2) as the
basis for charging the individual with another offense.”134
This language unequivocally abolishes any fear that an individual will be
charged with a secondary crime based upon their violation of State Rep. King’s
proposed duty to assist bill.
F. Creates the Possibility of Civil Liability
Some are concerned that the civil liability attached to bystander legislation
is too great to justify any potential benefits. Legislators can easily dispel this
concern by including a provision that reads something akin to the following:
“nothing contained in this section shall alter existing law with respect to civil
liability.” Whether the concerns are so great that legislators feel the need to
include such a provision is a discretionary decision.
Absent a provision exculpating an individual from civil liability, there are
still barriers towards bringing a civil action based upon bystander legislation. In
Wisconsin, a case was tried where the parents of a sixteen-year-old, whose life
was tragically cut short, attempted to bring a wrongful death suit with its basis
in the state’s bystander legislation.135 The complaint alleged the defendant’s
133
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inaction negligently led to their son’s death.136 The claim was dismissed because
the plaintiffs were unable to establish that the defendant’s inactions were the
proximate cause of their son’s death.137
Bringing a civil suit based upon bystander legislation requires the plaintiff
to show that, if the defendant had acted, then the injury or alleged damages
would not have occurred or would have been lessened. Bystander legislation
applies to individuals that had nothing to do with an individual’s original source
of peril. The obligation to assist or call for help only is triggered once an
individual is already suffering a serious physical injury that the bystander did
not contribute to in any way. Proving in civil litigation that “but for” the
bystander’s inactions the injury could not have taken place or was causally
aggravated by those inactions is a difficult burden to meet. Every civil suit listed
on Lexis or Westlaw that is predicated upon bystander legislation failed because
of the inability to establish that the bystander proximately caused or aggravated
any damages.138
Civil suits based on duty to assist legislation have proven difficult for their
proponents; however, the possibility of them being brought at all remains a
concern for some. State Rep. King attempted to allay all fears of civil liability
with language in his proposed bill:
This section does not create an independent basis for civil liability for
failure to provide the assistance described in this section. The fact that
an individual is charged with a crime under this section may not be
used to establish that the individual violated a duty on which a claim
for personal injuries may be based.139
G. Distrust of Law Enforcement
Research suggests that fear of police involvement is among the top reasons
that individuals do not call or delay calling for help in an emergency.140 This is
particularly common in situations that involve drug overdoses.141 In an attempt
to encourage individuals to call 911, forty states (as of July 25, 2017) have
passed laws that provide protection from prosecution for certain drug offenses
for both the person calling for medical assistance and the person who has
overdosed.142
Fear of law enforcement is also very real in minority communities.
According to the American Psychological Association (APA), “the probability
136
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of being black, unarmed and shot by police is about 3.5 times the probability of
being white, unarmed and shot by police.”143 The APA states that “[r]educing
and circumventing bias is one way to chip away at the disparities in how police
treat black civilians.”144 There are many ways to approach racially disparate
treatment by law enforcement, but it is a systematic problem that will take years,
if not decades, to solve. There is no evidence to suggest that the passage of duty
to assist legislation will have a positive or negative effect on the issues that
minorities face when it comes to law enforcement.
Human Rights Watch, an international, non-governmental organization,
stated that public safety is undermined because immigrant communities in the
United States are afraid of calling law enforcement.145 Crimes, like rape, go
unreported because victims fear that calling law enforcement will result in their
deportation.146 Individuals at the Human Rights Watch suggest that this problem
is difficult to fix on a community or state level and the best way to combat this
problem is for the U.S. Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform. 147
There are also those with family members who are mentally ill that resist
calling law enforcement out of fear that it may turn into a deadly encounter.148
In 2017, a mother in Brooklyn called 911 when her thirty-two-year-old son with
schizophrenia was acting erratically.149 Police were unable to calm the man and
opened fire after he lunged at them with a knife.150 Calling 911 to report
emotionally disturbed individuals has often resulted in the problem escalating.151
Efforts in New York City, and other cities alike, have been made so that officers
receive crisis intervention training and have attempted to deploy more teams to
calls involving the mentally ill that consist of a cop and a social worker.152
While there may be those who have a justified fear of calling 911, this
should not bar the implementation of duty to assist legislation. State Rep. King’s
proposed bill, along with other duty to assist bills already in place, does not
require an individual to remain at the scene after calling 911.
H. Aiding and Abetting Laws
States have differing versions of aiding and abetting laws, but the purpose
of these statutes is to hold an individual liable for another’s actions. Assisting
another individual to commit a criminal act is in itself criminal and makes the
143
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assistor an accomplice to that act. Accomplice liability is a basic principle of
criminal law which can be misinterpreted and is easier to understand when
broken down into its separate elements:
Proof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct
areas: (1) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus, or a crime committed by
direct perpetrator; (2) the aider and abettor’s mens rea, or knowledge
of direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and intent to assist in achieving
those unlawful ends; and (3) the aider and abettor’s actus reus, or
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists achievement of
crime.153
Utah’s law concerning criminal responsibility for direct commission of
offense or for conduct of another reads as the following: “[e]very person, acting
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.” 154
This language has been misconstrued by some who believe it should be
interpreted as holding individuals accountable for acts and situations that
bystander legislation is said to cover.155 Under this current legislation there
would be no liability for David Cash, who consciously decided not to report the
rape and murder of seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson. The District Attorney in
that case explained that to charge Cash with aiding and abetting, “we would have
to have evidence that Cash actually did something . . . with the thought and intent
of helping Strohmeyer.”156
Aiding and abetting statutes do not hold individuals responsible for
choosing to do nothing after witnessing a crime or seeing someone in distress.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[i]n order to aid and abet another to
commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant ‘in some sort associate himself
with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring
about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.’”157
Bystander legislation bridges the gap between instances where individuals
act in concert together to commit a crime and those where an individual simply
chooses not to summon assistance for someone they know is suffering a serious
bodily injury. It is the difference between active criminal intent and callous
indifference for the life of another human being.
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VIII. GOING FORWARD
The issue we have addressed in this article is amongst the most important
confronting an increasingly divisive, divided, and distant culture. The notion of
compromise, reconciliation, and efforts to understand the “other” are archaic. In
this atmosphere, the notion of “doing the right thing” is quainter than ever. That
aspirational moral code is just that, an aspirational model code. Perhaps in a
different era, not marked by the tone and tenor of today’s interaction, such an
ideal might have “held water.”
It harkens, seemingly, to a simpler day, recalling a 1950’s “father knows
best” environment. While the nostalgia is admirable, if not understandable, it is
of no benefit to the victim in need of assistance. That, ultimately, is the reason
we propose imposing a legal obligation on the bystander.
The proposed obligation on the bystander is minimal: just dial 911. The
obligation is imposed only when the victim has knowledge of bystander peril
and has the capability to act; furthermore, the burden is mitigated if acting
endangers the bystander. From a cost-benefit perspective, the burden on the
bystander is minimal whereas the benefit to the victim is significant. While we
are sensitive to the arguments opposing the proposal, particularly the notion of
“legislating morality,” we are of the belief that the discomfort, however valid,
fails to recognize the primacy of the victim’s needs.
The notion that imposing a legal duty on the bystander to dial 911 is akin
to “legislating morality” reflects two distinct approaches to the core question of
“to whom-what is a duty owed.” In recommending the imposition of criminal
penalty on the bystander, we are of the opinion that a duty to fully reflect
society’s recognition that a victim in peril requires assistance must be codified
in the criminal code.
Otherwise, it is not a duty but rather an amorphous concept, lacking weight
and substance. If not codified in the criminal code, there is no penalty for failing
to provide minimal assistance to the victim, thereby freeing the bystander of any
consequence or accountability. From the victim’s perspective, that is akin to
abandonment in the greatest hour of need. As history repeatedly demonstrates,
“consequence free” abandonment is the norm when examining the “interaction”
between victim and bystander.
It is that recurring pattern that our proposal seeks to tackle. While the
proposed penalty (in Utah) is modest—a Class B Misdemeanor with a penalty
of $1,000 and/or six months incarceration—imposing a legal duty is, from the
victim’s perspective, most significant. It is not an exaggeration to suggest it may
well be the difference between life and death. At the very least, it is the
difference between assistance in a time of peril and abandonment in a time of
peril. This is not a matter of “legislating morality,” but rather of imposing an
important legal duty on a person capable of assisting a person in peril.
However, a criminal code in and of itself is insufficient; undertaking a
significant educational effort is essential. Such an effort must be broad in scope
and ambitious in its goals. Devoid of such a determined focus, the legislation
will not carry its intended weight and will not have the desired impact. Re-stated,
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bystander legislation, to have the greatest impact, must be inculcated and
embedded into the core of society in a systematic and institutionalized manner.
This, then, is a “two-front” undertaking: law and education.
Our focus on the law and education is distinct from the voices of opposition
who rely on morality and basic human goodness. Because the argument is
compelling, it understandably resonates in many quarters. However, the
argument falls short when considered from the victim’s, rather than the
bystander’s, perspective. Framing the argument in this context—victim or
bystander—clarifies the dilemma confronting society, both practically and
existentially: to whom is a duty owed. That, more than anything, defines the
question of bystander obligation.
In framing the query as legal—not moral—the path we recommend moving
forward is clear. The most appropriate manner to ensure consequences for failing
to provide assistance to the person in peril is imposition of criminal penalty. To
rely on the “hopeful”—for that is the essence of a moral based approach—is to
fail the victim in the most critical hour of need. As both the pages of history and
contemporary accounts unequivocally demonstrate, victim reliance on the
“rightness-goodness” of the bystander is a misbegotten fallacy. Reversing
course, and on behalf of future victims, adopting a twin-track approach of
legislation and education is the most effective mechanism for providing
assistance to a human being in peril.
Final Thought: That is the most correct and effective answer to the
question: to whom is a duty owed.
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APPENDIX158
Proposed Legislation: Representative King’s legislation has been edited
and tailored to bestow a legal duty upon individuals in the most limited of
circumstances. The bill, as introduced during the 2019 legislative session, and
as likely will be introduced in upcoming sessions if, and until, it is passed, reads
as the following:
Representative Brian S. King proposes the following substitute bill:
911 RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN EMERGENCY
2019 GENERAL SESSION
STATE OF UTAH
Chief Sponsor: Brian S. King
Senate Sponsor: ____________
LONG TITLE
General Description:
This bill relates to the duty to contact emergency services in an
emergency.
Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
▸ defines terms;
▸ makes it a class B misdemeanor to fail to contact emergency
services in the event of a crime or another emergency subject to certain
exceptions;
▸ prohibits a prosecutor from basing charges for commission
of an offense other than the offense created in this bill on an
individual's failure to contact emergency services;
▸ amends provisions of the Good Samaritan Act to provide
immunity from liability to an individual who contacts emergency
services in accordance with the requirements of this bill;
▸ addresses civil liability issues related to this bill; and
▸ makes technical changes.
Money Appropriated in this Bill: None
Other Special Clauses: None
Utah Code Sections Affected:
AMENDS:
78B-4-501, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2018, Chapter 62
158
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ENACTS:
76-9-1101, Utah Code Annotated 1953
________________________________________
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 76-9-1101 is enacted to read:
Part 11. Failure to Provide Assistance
76-9-1101. Failure to provide assistance.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) (i) “Assistance” means making reasonable effort to contact
paramedics, fire protection, law enforcement, or other appropriate
emergency services.
(ii) “Assistance” does not include action that places the
individual taking the action, or another individual, in danger.
(b) “Emergency” means that an individual is suffering from
serious bodily injury and is in need of assistance.
(c) “Legal privilege” means any privilege designated by
common law, statute, or rule of evidence.
(d) “Serious bodily injury” means injury that involves a
substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain,
protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty.
(2) An individual is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if the
individual:
(a) observes that a crime has occurred or is occurring or that an
emergency is occurring;
(b) has personal knowledge that another individual is suffering
serious bodily injury resulting from a crime or emergency;
(c) is able to provide reasonable assistance to the individual
described in Subsection (2)(b); and
(d) fails to provide reasonable assistance to the individual
described in Subsection (2)(b).
(3) An individual is not guilty of violating Subsection (2) if the
individual reasonably believes another individual has, or likely has,
already provided or is providing reasonable assistance to the
individual described in Subsection (2)(b).
(4) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of state law, a
prosecutor may not use an individual’s violation of Subsection (2) as
the basis for charging the individual with another offense.
(5) This section does not create an independent basis for civil
liability for failure to provide the assistance described in this section.
(6) The fact that an individual is charged Ĥ→ or convicted ←Ĥ
with a crime under this section may not be used to establish that the
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individual violated a duty on which a claim for personal injuries may
be based.
(7) Subsection (2) does not apply to the extent that an individual
is prohibited from providing assistance by a legal privilege.
Section 2. Section 78B-4-501 is amended to read:
78B-4-501. Good Samaritan Law.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) “Child” means an individual of such an age that a reasonable
person would perceive the individual as unable to open the door of a
locked motor vehicle, but in any case younger than 18 years of age.
(b) “Emergency” means an unexpected occurrence involving
injury, threat of injury, or illness to a person or the public, including
motor vehicle accidents, disasters, actual or threatened discharges,
removal or disposal of hazardous materials, and other accidents or
events of a similar nature.
(c) “Emergency care” includes actual assistance or advice
offered to avoid, mitigate, or attempt to mitigate the effects of an
emergency.
(d) “First responder” means a state or local:
(i) law enforcement officer, as defined in Section 53-13-103;
(ii) firefighter, as defined in Section 34A-3-113; or
(iii) emergency medical service provider, as defined in Section
26-8a-102.
(e) “Motor vehicle” means the same as that term is defined in
Section 41-1a-102.
(2) A person who renders emergency care at or near the scene
of, or during, an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith, or as
required under Section 76-9-1101, is not liable for any civil damages
or penalties as a result of any act or omission by the person rendering
the emergency care, unless the person is grossly negligent or caused
the emergency.
(3) (a) A person who gratuitously, and in good faith, assists a
governmental agency or political subdivision in an activity described
in Subsections (3)(a)(i) through (iii) is not liable for any civil damages
or penalties as a result of any act or omission, unless the person
rendering assistance is grossly negligent in:
(i) implementing measures to control the causes of epidemic and
communicable diseases and other conditions significantly affecting
the public health, or necessary to protect the public health as set out in
Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local Health Departments;
(ii) investigating and controlling suspected bioterrorism and
disease as set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b, Detection of Public Health
Emergencies Act; and
(iii) responding to a national, state, or local emergency, a public
health emergency as defined in Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration
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by the president of the United States or other federal official requesting
public health-related activities.
[(3)](b) The immunity in this Subsection (3) is in addition to any
immunity or protection in state or federal law that may apply.
(4) (a) A person who uses reasonable force to enter a locked and
unattended motor vehicle to remove a confined child is not liable for
damages in a civil action if all of the following apply:
(i) the person has a good faith belief that the confined child is in
imminent danger of suffering physical injury or death unless the
confined child is removed from the motor vehicle;
(ii) the person determines that the motor vehicle is locked and
there is no reasonable manner in which the person can remove the
confined child from the motor vehicle;
(iii) before entering the motor vehicle, the person notifies a first
responder of the confined child;
(iv) the person does not use more force than is necessary under
the circumstances to enter the motor vehicle and remove the confined
child from the vehicle; and
(v) the person remains with the child until a first responder
arrives at the motor vehicle.
[(4)](b) A person is not immune from civil liability under this
Subsection (4) if the person fails to abide by any of the provisions of
Subsection (4)(a) or commits any unnecessary or malicious damage to
the motor vehicle.

